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CONTROL OF FOREIGN CORPORATE ACTIVITY
BY THE STATE OF INCORPORATION
WILLIAM DENNIS HAWKLAND*
Few aspects of corporation law are less understood by lawyers than the
apparently difficult problems which result from the attempts of corporations
to exercise in foreign states some powers which the), could not have availed
themsclvcs of in the state of incorporation. The confusion involved when
questions arise concerning the powers of foreign corporations can be traced
largely to the tcndency of the courts to use the language and concepts of
antiquated cases and theories. This unfortunate by-product of the doctrine
of stare decisis has led some courts into thc crror of feeling compelled to
honor restrictions placed on corporations by the state of incorporation, and
it has induced lawyers to approach the question by considering charter pro-
visions and foreign legislation rather than the choice of law rules of the
forum. The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the factors which
have promoted these misconceptions and to show that the problems which
result when a corporation attempts to exercise, in a foreign state, powers
denied to it by the state of incorporation are really quite simple conflict of
laws situations in which the jurisdictional contacts arc divided between the
two states so that the foreign state, when it is the forum, can resolve the
problem without in any way deferring to the laws of the incorporating state.
When corporations were first emerging as a new form of business associa-
tion, the sovereigns feared that they would monopolize all of the commer-
cial world if not strictly regulated. To prevent this anti-social growth a defi-
nite policy was promulgated to limit corporate power by making corporate
action impossible beyond the scope of the charter.' This policy was easily
effectuated because only the state of incorporation could grant charters, and
corporations came to be thought of as invisible, intangible creatures having
their existence only in contemplation of law 2 and possessing only those
powers expressly granted by charter.' Since it was said that a corporation
could not "exist" without its charter, the corporate 'charter had to be "car-
ried" everywhere the corporation went to do business, and, theoretically, the
limitations imposed therein were just as effective abroad as at homne.4 The
*Associate Professor of Law, Temple University. '[he research for this paper was
done at Columbia University School of Law, where the author did graduate work.
1. See BERLE AND WVARREN, BusiNEss ORCAN ZA'ON: CORPORATIONS 45 (1948).
2. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
3. Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 130 U.S. 24 (1890).
See Dartmouth College v. \Woodward, supra note 2 at 536; Schneider v. Greater NI. & S.
Circuit, Inc., 144 Misc. 534, 539, 259 N. Y. Supp. 319, 323 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
4. "Every corporation necessarily carries its charter wherever it goes for that is the
law of its existence. It may be restricted in the use of some of its powers while doing
business away from its corporate home, but every person who deals with it everywhere is
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
charter limitations, moreover, included appropriate legislation enacted by
the incorporating state subsequent to the incorporation, because it was
thought that where the state had reserved the right to alter, suspend, or re-
peal any corporate charter, the corporation was made subject to later limita-
tions resulting from such legislation. In short, the theory of charter limi-
tations had the effect of giving tile incorporating state ultimate authority
over the activities of its corporations even though such activities were wholly
exercised in another jurisdiction. XWhile this authority does not seem to
have been challenged by the foreign states in the early cases, it is at least
possible that the foreign state was not really compelled to judge the powers
of corporations coming into its jurisdiction by reference to their charters,
but simply did so as a conflict of laws choice of law matter in which it was
thought propitious not to use local law in resolving the question.6 Of
course, not all charter limitations were effective in foreign states since some
were expressly intended to have only local effect,7 and the necessity of char-
acterizing the restraints as "general" or "local" gave the foreign courts some
latitude in the matter. But, it is undoubtedly true that the foreign courts,
whether or not compelled to so reason, almost always thought that the incor-
porating state could properly limit the foreign activities of its corporations,
and the cases involving such activities were resolved by a careful considera-
bound to take notice of the provisions which have been made in its charter for the man-
agement and control of its affairs both in life and after dissolution." Relfe v. Rundle, 103
U.S. 222, 226 (1880).
5. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262 (1910); Asbury Hospital v. Cass
County, 72 N.D.359, 7 N.W.2d 438 (1943); see Zabriskie v. Hackensack, N. Y. Ry. Co.,
18 N. j. Eq. 178 (1867). This reservation was made necessary by the famous Dartmouth
College Case, supra note 2, which held that a charter granted by the legislature to a cor-
poration is a contract between the state and the corporators and that the state cannot
constitutionally take away or impair any of the franchises or privileges granted by it. he
assumption that the legislative grant is a contract is clearly inconsistent with current think-
ing. See Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Coroorate Charters, 75 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 585, 593-594 (1927).
6. By strong dictun the leading case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 19 Pet. 519, 587-
588 (U. S. 1839) stated that a corporation is everywhere bound by its charter. Said the
court, " . . . and it may be safely assumed that a corporation can make no contracts, and
do no acts either within or without the state which creaes it, except such as are authorized
by its charter ... and if the law creating a corporation, does not, by the, true construction
of the words used in the charter, give it the right to exercise powers beyond the limits
of the state, all contracts made by it in other states would be voicL" Other cases, like
Canada So. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 537 (1883) have said that appropriate restric-
tions must be recognized abroad, but no case can be found in which the foreign court was
compelled by due process or full faith and credit to honor either charter limitations or
the statutory restrictions enacted by the incorporating state.
7. Charter restrictions classified as "local" appear in the following cases: Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, supra note 6; Varner v. Foshay, 57 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1932); Heirs &
Adm'r of Hitchcock v. United States Bank of Penn., 7 Ala. 386 (1845); White v.
Howard, 38 Conn. 342 (1871).
8. One exception might be the case of The Whitman Mining Co. v. Baker, 3 Nev.
386 (1867). In that case the court said this: "If we permit a foreign corporation to
conduct mining operations and acquire real estate within our limits, it appears to us our
legislature is the proper power to limit that corporation in the extent of its acquisitions,
and not the legislature in another state which grants the charter. If the legislature of
another state were to create a corporation to conduct mining operations in this state and
authorize it to buy and hold a million acres of land, our legislature might prohibit their
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tion of the corporate charter provisions. Accordingly, lawyers at this time
wisely began their research by scrutinizing the charter and the laws of the
incorporating state.
The policy of limiting corporate power by charter restrictions, however,
was strongly opposed by businessmen"i who, in managing corporations, were
annoyed by restrictions denying them the right to arrange convenient and
profitable transactions in the best interests of the enterprise, and by others
who were equally annoyed by the defense of ultra vires, which, in its extreme
form, had supported decisions that corporations could do no wrong because
their charters did not authorize wrongs.10  This oppositon eventually in-
duced the courts to make inroads into the policy by deciding that some
transactions, while far in excess of the express chartered powers, were author-
ized because necessary to the existence of the corporation or to the purposes
for which it was formed," and that the defense of ultra vires could not be
raised in certain cases.' This tendency to enlarge the scope of corporate
powers carried over into the field of foreign corporations where the courts
were inclined to interpret charters in a way most favorable to the business
interests, and, in a very real sense, a situation resulted in which the incor-
porating state was fast losing control over the foreign activities of its corpora-
tions. This great victory for the businessmen culminated near the end of
the nineteenth century when the policy of limiting corporations by charter
was abandoned in favor of restrictions imposed by positive legislation.'a
buying more than one acre. On the other hand, if they were by their charter allowed to
hold only one acre of land, our legislature might (by a general law, for it can pass no
special law in regard to corporations) extend the right to buy a million acres. If under
such a law the corporation purchased more than its original charter allowed, it might be
amenable to some proceedings on the part of the State or Government granting the
charter, but it would not whilst it remained a corporation lose its land under our laws."
9. See BERLE AND WARREN, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS: CORPORATIONS 46 (1948).
10. The doctrine that a corporation can do no wrong was the accepted notion in the
days of Blackstone. See I BL. Comr. 476 (1756). But it has been rejected by modern
courts. See United States v. Nearing, 252 Fed. 223, 231 (S. D. N.Y. 1918); Cohen v.
United States, 157 Fed. 651, 653 (2d Cir. 1907); Cornford v. Carelton Bank, I Q. B.
392 (1889). "In one sense, every corporation has 'power' to do wrong, and also 'capacity'
to suffer the consequences for wrongdoing, but 'power' should not be confused with
'capacity' and 'authority', and no corporation has 'authority' to violate an inhibition or go
beyond the limits of its charter." Yonkers v. Downey, 309 U. S, 590, 597 (1940). Sce
Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporation, 35 YALE L. 1. 13, 18 (1925).
11. As early as Sutton's Hospital case. 10 Coke 23A, 30B (1613) the idea had been
advanced that a corporation could have "implied" powers as well as explicit powers, but
the real inroads came later in cases like the following: Jacksonville, N. P. Ry. & Nav.
Co. v. Hlooper, 160 U. S. 514 (1896); Alton Mfg. Co. v. Garrett Biblical Inst., 243 Ill.
298, 90 N. E. 704 (1910); Malone v. Lancaster Co., 182 Pa. 309, 37 At. 932 (1897).
12. See Morris v. Hall, 41 Ala. 510 (1868); Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Missouri Poultry
& Game Co., 287 Mo. 400, 229 S. W. 813 (1921). See also cases collected in 14A C. I.
319, 18 C.J.S. § 49d, Corporations p. 430. "There is a somewhat new and growing doc-
trine, that whether a corporation has acted in excess of its granted powers, or in face of
an express or implied statutory prohibition is one which cannot be raised in litigation be-
tween it and a private party, but can only be raised by the state." City Coal & Ice Co. v.
Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 140 Va. 600, 607-608, 125 S.E. 697, 699 (1924).
13. There is no doubt that the change in policy was a victory for businessmen because
the general incorporation laws which replaced the idea of charter limitations now make it
easy for corporations practically to define their own powers by drawing appropriate char-
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This change in policy completed the freedom that foreign courts could
exercise in deciding cases concerning the powers of foreign corporations, be-
cause the statutory restrictions of the incorporating state, of their own force,
could have no extraterritorial effect,' 4 and, with the charter no longer an
instrument designed to limit corporations, no mechanics remained by which
the incorporating state could control the out-of-state activities of its corpora-
tions. It is true that the state of incorporation can still institute quo war-
ranto proceedings against a corporation which has violated its charter abroad,
and the fact that the foreign state has permitted the exercise of the prohib-
ited power in no way limits this right. Yet, the acts upon which the quo
warranto action is based in such a situation already are consummated, and,
except for the ouster proceedings, it should be for the foreign court to deter-
mine their effect.' 5 Injunction proceedings brought by the state of incor-
poration'0 or by shareholders in the incorporating state could, at most,' 7
only prevent threatened ultra vires acts abroad, because it is clear that once
the corporation has acted no one will be permitted to eujoin the foreign
state to look to the laws of the incorporating state to determine the effect of
that action. Nor is there anything in the federal Constitution which would
compel the foreign state in deciding the consequences to be attached to the
exercise of corporate powers within its territory to refer to the laws of the
ters or amending existing ones. See BERLE AND WARRENu, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: COR-
IORATIONS 47 (1948).
14. Except insofar as the due process and full faith and credit provisions of the
federal Constitution compel one state to give operative effect to the laws of another. It
is pointed out later in this paper that neither of these constitutional limitations on state
power in the field of conflict of laws will be invoked in cases where the foreign state has
as great an interest in the subject matter of the dispute as the state of incorporation.
15. Furthermore, the foreign state, by domestication proceedings, can preserve the
legal existence of a corporation put out of business by quo warranto proceedings instituted
by the incorporating state.
16. The courts are not in agreement whether a state can enjoin threatened ultra vires
acts. Some courts have held that quo warranto proceedings are the exclusive remedy.
Att'y Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 olns. Ch. 371 (N. Y. 1817); Att'y Gen. v. Tudor Ice
Co., 104 Mass. 239 (1870). But other courts have held that the state may bring such
an action. Trust Co. of Georgia v. State, 109 Ga. 736, 35 S. E. 323 (1900); Columbian
Athletic Club v. State ex ret. McMahan, 143 Ind. 98, 40 N. E. 914 (1895); State v.
Minnesota Threasher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 213, N. V. 1020 (1889).
17. There is still some question whether or not this type of equity decree is entitled
to full faith and credit. Professor Beale took the position that "An equitable decree
for the doing of an act, except the mere payment of money, is not by our law enforceable
in another court, even of the same state; there is no form of proceedings for enforcing
the merely personal decree of a court of equity except by order of the court rendering it."
3 BEALE, SUMMARY OF CONFLICT OF5 LAWS, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 536, 537
(1902). But, most text writers have not agreed with Beale. See STUMEERO, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 96-97 (1937); GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 561 (1938). See also, Cook, Powers
of Courts of Equity, 15 COL. L. REv. 37 (1915); Barbour, The Extra-territorial Effect of
the Equitable Decree, 17 Mien. L. REv. 527 (1919); Lorenzen, Application of Full
Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land, 34
YAL. L. 1. 591 (1925). The courts are not agreed on the question. Compare Bullock
v. Bullock, 52 N. 1. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676 (1894) with Burnlcy v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St.
474 (1873). While it is difficult to understand why final equity decrees should not be
entitled to full faith and credit since they clearly come within the meaning of the legis-
lation implementing the "full faith and credit" clause, the point will not be set at rest
until the United States Supreme Court decides it.
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state of incorporation. Of course, it has been held that a serious error by a
state court in applying choice of law principles violates the "due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 If all the contacts of a case are in
state X, and state Y, the foruln, nevertheless, insists on applying its own
local law, it seems desirable in the interests of uniformity and the expecta-
tions of the parties to nullify state Y's provincialism by invoking the "due
process" clause.1" But, where the contracts are split between state X and
state Y, it would be an unjustified imposition to compel the latter to refer
to the laws of the former, and the Supreme Court of the United States has
indicated that it will not invoke due process in such a case.2 0 In the problem
at hand, the foreign state has at least as great an interest in the matter as
the incorporating state, and there is no reason why it should not be able to
utilize its own laws if it so desires. Likewise, a resort to the full faith and
credit provisions of the Constitution where the limitation has been imposed
by statute would be futile. Until recent times the Supreme Court has not
required full faith and credit to be given to statutes even though the enabling
act implementing the clause clearly indicated that statutes were entitled to
the same consideration as judgments. Be that as it may, the "full faith
and credit" clause, like due process, cannot be invoked to compel a state to
refer to the laws of another state when the former has as great an interest in
the controversy as the latter.2-
It is not surprising, then, to find a decision by the United States Supreme
Court to the effect that a foreign state violates no constitutional principles
in allowing corporations to exercise greater powers in its territory than the
corporate charter would allow. In Stone v. Southern Illinois & Mo. Bridge
Co.,2 2 an Illinois corporation was formed for the purpose of erecting and
maintaining a bridge across the Mississippi river. Although its charter did
not give it the power of cmient domain, the corporation, acting pursuant
to a Missouri statute, condemned land in MIissouri. Missouri landowners
resisted the condemnation on the grounds that the Illinois corporation was
denied this right by its charter, but the Supreme Court of Missouri found
for the corporation. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the
decision of the lower court was affirmed. The Court said that the question
of whether or not an Illinois corporation can exercise eminent domain pow-
ers in Missouri notwithstanding the fact its charter did not give it this
power "involves the powers of corporations under the laws of Missouri,
which (is) concluded by the adjudication of the state supreme court ...
In our view no federal right was taken from the plaintiff in error by the
18. Hartford Ace. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143(1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Brown, 234 U. S. 542 (1914).
19. See GOODRICH, Coi.Ic-r o LAws 22 (1938).
20. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Ace. Comin'r, 294 U. S. 532 (1935).
21. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'r, supra note 20; Pacific Employ.
ers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Conr'r, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
22. 206 U. S. 267 (1907), affg 174 Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 453 (1903).
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action complained of under the laws as interpreted by the Supreme Court of
the State of Missouri."
Vhile it is clear that the foreign court is not compelled to refer to the
corporate charter or the laws of the incorporating state in deciding what
powers a corporation can exercise in its jurisdiction, a great deal of confu-
sion has resulted from the continued use of concepts and theories developed
during the period of time when the charter was used to limit corporate
power and when it was thought that the incorporating state could complete-
ly control the foreign activities of its corporations through appropriate
charter restrictions. Because decisions are often based on these antiquated
concepts, some courts undoubtedly have been led to believe that they are not
competent to allow foreign corporations to exercise powers in excess of their
charters. For example, in Diamond Match Co. v. Powers," a Delaware cor-
poration sought a writ of mandamus to compel the register of deeds of a
Michigan county to make title facilities available to it in order that the pre-
liminary steps to the purchase of land might be taken. The court refused to
issue the writ on the ground that the corporation's charter did not authorize
it to purchase land. The court said: "Unless the state of Delaware, to
which it owes its existence and within whose dominion it belongs, has legal-
ly empowered it to deal in land and in land titles, it cannot engage ill such
affairs in Michigan. . . .It (Michigan) may stop short and tolerate but a
part of relator's chartered powers, or a limited rather than a full exertion of
them. But, it will never concede permission to go beyond the charter." It
may be, of course, that the court was using charter limitation concepts as a
choice of law device to make reference to the laws of Delaware, but it seems
more probable that the court thought it was bound to honor the charter
restriction, since the traditional choice of law reference in cases involving
land is to the situs state.21
In Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Kansas City S. & G. By. Co.25 a Texas utility
was formed for the purpose of operating telegraph and telephone lines in
five counties in Texas. Although its charter limited its operations to these
counties, the corporation began doing business in Louisiana and attempted
to condemn land there. The Louisiana court denied the company the right
of eminent domain by stating that, while the policy of the state was to
encourage the development of communication companies, this policy could
not be used to give a foreign corporation greater powers than its charter had
provided. Here it seems clear that Louisiana thought it had to honor the
charter limitation, because an application of either the usual conflict of laws
choice of law rules for cases involving eminent domain 26 or of local public
policy would have dictated a contrary decision.
23, 51 Mich. 145, 16 N. W. 314 (1883).
24, White v. Howard, 38 Conn. 342 (1871); Whitman Gold & Silver Mining Co.
v. Baker. 3 Nev. 386 (1867); Tarpy v. Deseret Salt Co. 5 Utah 494, 17 Pac. 631 (1888).
25. 108 La. 691, 32 So. 958 (1902).
26, Stone v. Southern Ill. & Mo. Bridge Co,, 206 U. S. 267 (1907), aff'g 174 Mo-
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Ordinarily, however, the use of charter limitation concepts appears to be
a choice of law device leading to the same result which would have been
reached had reliance been placed on traditional conflict of laws rules, Thus,
if the prevailing choice of law rule requires a court to refer to the laws of
another state, this reference is usually accomplished in cases involving for-
eign corporations by classifying germane charter limitations as "general", in-
tended to be effective everywhere, or by determining that the laws of the
incorporating state are part of the corporate charter which travel with it and
restrict the corporation wherever it goes. On the other hand, if the choice
of law rules dictate a reference to local laws only, the charter limitations are
by-passed on the ground that they are "local" prohibitions, intended to be
effective solely in the incorporating state, or that legislation enacted by the
incorporating state is "procedural" or is not of the type that becomes part of
the charter. In Turner v. Goetz,21 for example, a reference is made to for-
eign legislation by finding that it became part of the charter and hence had
extraterritorial effect. The Turner Manufacturing Company was organized
under the laws of Delaware but was doing its principal business in Wiscon-
sin. It entered into a contract in Wisconsin with plaintiff, a resident of Wis-
consin, for the purchase of its own shares of stock. By Delaware law such a
purchase could be made only out of surplus, but by the laws of Wisconsin
the purchase could be made out of capital. The corporation had no sur-
plus, and, when it went bankrupt, the plaintiff brought suit for a part of
the purchase price still due. The lower court held for the plaintiff on the
theory that the validity of the contract was to be determined by Wisconsin
law, but on appeal it was held that the lower court should be reversed. The
court said that corporations may come into existence only on such terms as
the legislature of the state of creation may prescribe, and one of the condi-
tions under which the incorporators were permitted to bring the Turner
company into existence was that the corporation should not have the right
to purchase its own stock except out of surplus. And, being so limited by
the laws of Delaware, concluded the court, the corporation could not gain
authorization from the laws of Wisconsin to purchase stock out of capital.
It could be that the Wisconsin court felt that it was compelled to judge the
case by Delaware law, but it is more reasonable to assume that Delaware law
was utilized because the case involved the internal affairs of a corporation
which, as a choice of law matter, are usually determined by referring to the
laws of the state of incorporation.2 Such a choice of law is desirable be-
cause the shareholders are led to expect that the laws of the incorporating
1, 73 S. W. 453 (1903); Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co., 202 Fed. 776 (S. D.
Iowa 1913); Central Hanover Bank v. Pan-American Airways, Inc., 137 Fla. 808, 188 So.
820 (1939); New York, N. H. R. R. v. Welsh, 143 N. Y. 411, 38 N. E. 378 (1894);
Northwestern Electric Co. v. Zimmerman, 67 Ore. 150, 135 Pac. 330 (1913).
27. 184 Wis. 508, 199 N. W. 155 (1924).
28. Southern Sierras Power Co. v. R. R. Comm'n of Cal., 205 Cal. 479, 271 Pac.
747 (1928); In re Fryeburg Water Co., 79 N. H. 123, 106 Ath. 225 (1919); Dunham v.
Chemical Bank and Trust Co,, 180 Okla. 537, 71 P.2d 468 (1937); Clark v. Memphis
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state will be used to solve such questions, but it is one thing to say that the
forum should refer to these laws as a matter of propriety and another to say
that the reference must be made regardless of the forum's own notions of
justice and the ends of law.29 Wisconsin undoubtedly invoked Delaware law
in this case because it thought such a choice would enable it to reach a just
result, and not because it felt that it could not refuse such a reference if it
had been so inclined. But if this is true, the decision is misleading because,
at first blush at least, the impression is created that the court had no choice
of law and was compelled to use Delaware law even though such a refer-
ence would violate some local policy.
Warner Co. v. Foshay9 well illustrates how courts sometimes character-
ize charter limitations as "local" and statutory limitations as "procedural"
or as not being a part of the charter in order to give operative effect to local
law. The Warner company, a Minnesota corporation, loaned money to the
Foshay company, a Delaware corporation having its principal place of busi-
ness in Minnesota, and a usurious rate of interest by the laws of both states
was charged. According to Delaware law no corporation could interpose
the defense of usury, and this disability was to be made a part of every
charter of all Delaware corporations. When Warner company sued in the
Minnesota federal district court for the principal and interest, Foshay plead-
ed usury as a defense. The Warner company objected to the court's ruling
that the defense was proper, and after the lower court had found for the
defendant, it appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the lower
court held that the contract was governed by Minnesota law because it was
made in Minnesota, was to be performed in Minnesota, and the parties in-
tended this law to be applied. In answering the contention that the Foshay
company had no power under its charter to plead usury as a defense, the
court held that the Delaware statute was procedural and was not intended
to have any effect outside of the state, and, while the prohibition may have
been incorporated into the charter of the company, it is a local prohibition
only and does not limit the company in Minnesota. Moreover, the court
said that not all parts of the charter travel with a corporation when it
migrates to a foreign state, and it is this type charter limitation that does not
accompany the enterprise.
It is difficult to argue with the result reached in this case, but to classify
the Delaware statute as a local prohibition only seems dubious in the light
of its legislative history. An earlier case, M. Lowenstein v. British-American
St. Ry., 123 Tenn. 232, 130 S. W. 751 (1910). See Central Life Securities Co. v.
Smith, 236 Fed. 170, 176 (7th Cir. 1916); Golden v. Cervenka, 278 111. 409, 440, 116
N. E. 273, 286 (1917); Dunbar v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. 238 I11. 456, 485-487, 87
N.E. 521, 533 (1909).
29. Even whiere there is every reason to refer to the laws of the state of incorpora-
tion, as in cases relating to the internal affairs of the company, it is still possible for the
forum to refuse the reference. See State ex rel Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of
Delaware, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372 (1942).
30. 57 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1932).
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Mfg. Co.,31 had avoided a previous Delaware statute denying corporations
the right to set up usury as a defense by stating that the statute was intended
to be effective only in Delaware. But the court indicated that had the
statute been made a part of every corporate charter it would have governed.
Possibly as a result of this case, the statute was amended to provide that it
was to be made a part of every corporate charter. Nevertheless, the Foshay
case classified it as local. This is some evidence that the forum does not
decide these cases by carefully considering whether or not the limitation
involved was intended by the incorporating state to be local or general, pro-
cedural or substantive, or of a type that travels or does not travel with the
charter. On the contrary, it utilizes its own conflict of laws rules to deter-
mine whether or not a reference should be made to foreign law, and having
decided, either makes the reference by classifying the limitation as general
or refuses it by classifying the limitation as local. Thus, the same restriction
is sometimes classified by one court as general and by another court as local.
Compare, for example, the case of White v. Howard32 with Starkweather v.
American Bible Society. 3 In the White case, land located in Connecticut
was devised by a testator domiciled in that state to the American Tract
Society, a New York charitable corporation. The Statute of Wills of New
York prohibited this corporation from taking land by devise, but Connecti-
cut law was otherwise. In determining the validity of the gift the Connecti-
cut court found that the New York Statute of Wills was intended as a local
prohibition only and hence did not limit the power of the American Tract
Society to take land in Connecticut. In the Starkweather case, the Amer-
ican Bible Society was a charitable corporation incorporated under the laws
of New York, and like the American Tract Society in the White case, it
was prohibited by the New York Statute of Wills from acquiring real estate.
In a suit in Illinois to determine whether or not it could receive Illinois
land under the will of a testator who died domiciled in that state, the court
held that it could not. Said the court: "Appellee contends that the Statute
of Wills of New York only operates as a disability upon all persons in that
state to become devisors of real estate to this company, and that the charter
does not prevent them from receiving lands in other states, by devise, from
persons beyond the limits of the state, and hence this devise is valid and
binding. We have seen that the courts of New York have held that such
companies are not authorized to take and hold property in that state; and it
incapable of doing so there, how, it may be asked, can it exercise powers and
discharge functions beyond the limits of that state which created and en-
dowed it with its powers and functions? Such bodies have such powers, only,
as are conferred upon them by the laws of the state in which they are cre-
ated." While these two cases may be harmonized by showing that Illinois
31. 300 Fed. 853 (D. Conn. 1924).
32. 38 Conn. 342 (1871).
33. 71 Ill. 50, 22 Am. Rep. 133 (1874).
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and Connecticut have different choice of law rules relevant to situations in
which foreign charitable corporations are devised land, or by claiming that
one court used charter limitation concepts as a choice of laws device whereas
the other considered itself bound absolutely to honor the restrictions which
the incorporating state had placed on its corporations, the decisions demon-
strate that a lawyer will be hard put to predict the result of a controversy by
merely considering the charter or legislative restraints imposed by the state
of incorporation. He will be on safer ground if he detenines whether or
not the forum thinks it has a choice of law and, if so, what that choice is.
By the same reasoning, it is futile to try to gain insight into the question
of the powers of foreign corporations by studying the charter or the laws of
the incorporating state with a view toward learning whether or not some
particular statute has been so consolidated into the charter that it will travel
with the corporation when it does business in foreign states. " While it is
clear that some courts feel they are bound to honor all extraterritorial restric-
tions placed on corporations by the creating state, others will either utilize
or avoid these restrictions according to their own choice of law rules. Con-
sider, for example, the cases of Canada Southern R. R. Co. v. Gebhard5 and
\Vashington-Alaska Bank v. Dexter Horton National Bank.36 In the Alaska
Bank case, a bank was incorporated under the laws of Nevada and was doing
its principal business in Alaska. By the laws of Nevada certain depositors
were entitled to priority in payment, but Alaska recognized no such priority.
When the bank went into the hands of receivers, the plaintiff, domiciled in
Alaska, sued there to establish a priority. The court denied his claim on the
ground that the Nevada statute did not become a part of the charter which
the corporation carried with it when it migrated to Alaska. In the Canada
Southern Railroad case, the railroad, a Canadian corporation, became finan-
cially embarrassed, and Parliament authorized it to enforce upon its mort-
gage creditors a settlement by which they were to receive other securities in
place of their mortgage bonds. Although the scheme was approved by the
majority of the bondholders, certain mortgage creditors domiciled in the
United States objected to the plan, and they brought suit in federal court to
have it set aside. The United States Supreme Court eventually got the case
and recovery was denied. Mr. Chief Justice Waite based his decision on the
notion that the legislation became part of the charter and hence affected
creditors equally at home and abroad. Said he, "A corporation must dwell
34. Morawetz stated that "'lhe charter contract alone is recognized. It is the char-
ter alone which is recognized by the laws of comity, and not the general legislation of
the state in which the corporation was formed. The general laws and regulations of a
state are intended to govern only within the limits of the state enacting them, and a
state would have no power to give them extraterritorial force." 2 MoRAWETZ, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 967 (1886). But such a test would not enable lawyers to predict the
results of these cases, because the courts often state that some legislation travels with the
charter, and one court has said that no distinction should be made bcween charters and
statutes. See McGill v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 Fed. 637, 652 (D. Md. 1917).
35. 109 U. S. 527 (1883).
36. 263 Fed. 304 (9th Cir. 1920).
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in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty,
though it may do business in all places where its charter allows and the local
laws do not forbid. But wherever it goes for business it carries its charter
for that is the law of its existence, and the charter is the same abroad as it
is at home. Whatever disabilities are placed upon the corporation at
home it retains abroad, and whatever legislative control it is subjected to at
home must be recognized and submitted to by those who deal with it else-
where." It is suggested that all parts of the charter traveled in the Canada
Southern Railroad case because that case involved internal affairs of a cor-
poration and hence the forum's conflict of laws rules indicated that a refer-
ence should be made to the laws of the incorporating state;37 all parts of
the charter did not travel in the Washington-Alaska Bank case because the
forum's conflict of laws dictated that no reference should be made to the
laws of the incorporating state to determine preferential payments in view of
insolvency. 38 Yet, the legislation in both cases dealt with creditors' rights
against financially embarrassed corporations, and a lawyer attempting to pre-
dict the results of these cases by merely studying the legislation itself and the
corporate charters might be considerably perplexed by the decisions.
Nor should the lawyer examine foreign legislation to ascertain whether it
is procedural or substantive, for the cases indicate that the forum often will
make whatever classification is necessary to give operative effect to its own
choice of law rules.39 In discussing Warner v. Foshay it was observed that
the Delaware statute denying corporations the defense of usury was classified
as procedural and thus rejected in favor of local law. But in Freeze v.
Brownell4 a different court classified a similar New York statute as sub-
stantive. Though it is possible that these cases were decided by honestly
considering the statutes involved, it seems more likely that the courts were
more concerned with the question of whether or not a reference to the laws
of the incorporating state should be made than they were in determining
whether or not the statutes were actually intended to be procedural or sub-
37. "Nor does Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard ... relied upon by the appel-
lant, support the contention. That case only laid down the doctrine recently affirmed by
this court . . .that the legal relations of the members of a corporation to the corporation
and to each other must be regulated and controlled by the law of the jurisdiction in which
the corporation is organized .... " Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268 U. S. 552
(1925).
38. McLean v. Tucker. 26 Cal. App.2d 126, 130-131, 78 P.2d 1168, 1170-1171
(1938); Warren v. First National Bank of Columbus, 149 Ill. 9, 24-25, 38 N. E. 122
125-126 (1893); Boehm v. Rail, 51 N. 1. Eq. 541, 545-546, 26 At. 832, 834 (N. J. Ch.
1893); Pairpoint Mfg. Co. v. Philadelphia Optical Co., 161 Pa. 17, 22, 28 At]. 1003
(1894). See Borton v. Brines-Chase Co., 175 Pa. 209, 211, 34 Atl. 597 (1896).
39. See Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds, 32 YALE L. 1., 311 (1923); Stumberg
CONFLICT OF LAWS, 148 (1937); Cook, Substance & Procedure in the Conflicts of Laws,
42 YALE L. 1. 333 (1933); McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure, 78 U.
oF PA. L. REv. 933 (1930).
40. 35 N. J. L., 285, 10 Am. Rep. 239 (1871).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
stantive. Different results were reached because of the difference in choice
of law rules, and not because of any disparity in the two statutes.
Thus, it appears that a great deal of unnecessary confusion has been
brought about because the courts continue to use the language and concepts
of the late departed but unlamented theory of charter limitations. This
confusion, which has led some courts erroneously to believe that they are
compelled to honor restrictions placed on corporations by the incorporating
state even in the face of some contrary local public policy and has induced
lawyers to approach the question by considering charter provisions and for-
eign legislation rather than the choice of law rules of the forum, should be
ended by clear cut holdings that the forum is competent to resolve the prob
lem in accordance with its own conflict of laws rules. Some progress is
being made in this direction, but it seems likely that many courts for some
time will continue to talk about charter limitations, procedural and substan-
tive restrictions and legislation traveling or not traveling with the charter,
and the present confusion will continue unless lawyers realize that their
research must commence with a consideration of whether or not the forum
thinks it has a choice of law, and, if so, what that choice is. Only then will
clarification be possible.
